Policy on Okkinga.com

Who Controls the Algorithms That Shape Our Elections?

Sun, 15 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000

As France approaches its 2026 municipal elections, a more fundamental question than campaign strategy emerges: who controls what voters are able to see online?

European elections no longer unfold only in town halls, television studios, or printed newspapers. They unfold inside privately owned ranking systems. When a candidate speaks, the decisive question is no longer simply what was said? It is: how did the algorithm rank it? Thus visibility is no longer organic but allocated. Much of Europe’s political communication now depends on platforms headquartered outside Europe. These platforms determine which posts trend, which clips go viral, which narratives gain momentum, and which disappear into obscurity. They are not neutral conduits. They are systems that prioritise, weight, and reorder information at scale.

Is Microsoft Authenticator a Single Point of Failure? The Attack Surface vs. Blast Radius Trade-Off

Fri, 13 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000

When Authentication Becomes a Chokepoint

Reducing all entry points to a single, well-guarded door appears rational.

Centralising authentication through Microsoft Authenticator and Microsoft Entra ID standardises policy enforcement. It reduces configuration drift. It simplifies monitoring. Every user passes through the same control point.

From a security engineering perspective, consolidation improves defensive quality.

But consolidation changes the structure of dependency.

Digital fragility rarely begins as a technical defect. It becomes visible when control and dependency diverge under stress. When a single access layer gates multiple systems, continuity depends on that layer’s availability and governance.

How to Build Democratic Resilience in the Age of Platform Algorithms

Thu, 05 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000

In the weeks leading up to the 2024 European Parliament elections, coordinated attempts were made to manipulate online political debate across the European Union. What distinguished this election cycle was not the absence of interference, but the response: several operations were identified and disrupted early, before they escalated into the visible disruption seen in previous elections.

This shift followed the entry into force of the Digital Services Act. It is a hopeful development for democratic resilience at a time when elections are increasingly exposed to interference, disinformation, and organised propaganda.

What it really takes to leave Gmail after 20 years

Thu, 05 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000

I absolutely love Gmail.

I signed up on 11 January 2005. I still have the welcome email. At the time, 1 GB of storage felt unreal. No more full inboxes. An uncannily good spam filter. Then came Calendar, Contacts, Google Drive and later the fabulous Google suite. For years, it was genuinely hard to beat.

That assessment has not changed. What changed was the context around it.

When comfort stops being neutral

Over the past year, I have become acutely aware of how dependent much of the world has become on US-based digital infrastructure. That dependency is mapped and explored in more detail in my dependency map.

The sovereignty question the Big Three cloud providers cannot answer

Wed, 04 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000

European “sovereign cloud” offerings have become more sophisticated.

Separate EU entities. EU staff. EU data centres. EU governance models.

Yet there is one question the Big Three cloud providers still cannot answer.

Can you guarantee that this service will continue to operate if your home government orders it to stop?

For Amazon Web Services, Microsoft, and Google, the honest answer is no.

Not because of bad intent. Because of law.

Who controls sovereignty after the contract is signed?

Wed, 04 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000

We often talk about digital sovereignty as a technology problem. In practice, it is usually an ownership problem.

An organisation can host systems in the EU, use EU staff, and meet every compliance requirement. Yet if the supplier can be acquired, controlled, or pressured by a foreign parent, sovereignty quietly evaporates over time.

This is where protected ownership comes in.

Protected ownership means that decisive control over a provider cannot be sold, transferred, or coerced without structurally breaking its mandate. In practice, this shows up as foundations, mission-locked statutes, golden shares, or governance vetoes on change of control. Ownership and economic value may exist, but governance is structurally designed to prevent hostile takeovers, jurisdictional drift, and short-term exits.

If Europe wants sovereignty, it must back its digital infrastructure

Tue, 03 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Debates about European digital sovereignty frequently focus on the absence of EU-headquartered hyperscalers. This framing equates sovereignty with platform valuation and global market share.

However, Europe’s most durable digital influence has emerged not from platform dominance, but from foundational infrastructure: open standards, protocols and software layers that structure global markets without enclosing them.

If sovereignty is defined as reduced exposure to external control and lower structural lock-in, then infrastructure — not hyperscale platform replication — is the relevant policy lever.

When Microsoft pulled the plug

Mon, 02 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000

This was not a security failure.
It was a continuity failure caused by jurisdiction.

On 5 February 2025, something quietly unprecedented happened.

The email account of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was disabled.
Not hacked or compromised.
Not suspended for misuse by his organisation.

Access was removed because the service provider, Microsoft, was legally required to comply with US sanctions.

The consequence was immediate and practical. Without access to official email, the Chief Prosecutor could not conduct routine correspondence, coordinate with staff and partner states, or carry out core day-to-day duties.

Why many “sovereign clouds” aren’t actually sovereign

Tue, 27 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000

When hyperscalers launched their European “sovereign cloud” offerings, the promise sounded reassuring: EU data centres, EU staff, EU operations. On closer inspection, that promise often collapses.

This article sets out the structural and legal basis for evaluating “sovereign cloud” claims, with references to applicable law and documented failure cases.

The comforting story

Most sovereign cloud propositions emphasise where data is stored:

Data centres in the EU
Operations run by European entities
Compliance with GDPR and EU regulations

For many buyers, that feels like sovereignty. It is not.